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Introduction
The Choso˘n Korea court (1392–1910) adopted the diplomatic policy of sadae kyorin
for relations with Tokugawa Japan (1603–1868).  “Sadae kyorin” was a combination of 
the two words sadae (serving the great) and kyorin (equal standing with the neighboring 
countries).  The policy lasted for almost ﬁve hundred years, until the end of the 
Choso˘n period in the late nineteenth century, as the philosophical foundation of the 
diplomatic relations.  Under the diplomatic principle of sadae kyorin, which was based 
on Confucian doctrine, Sino–Korean relations are often interpreted as a superior–infe-
rior relationship, and the Japanese–Korean relations are seen as one of equal standing 
throughout the Choso˘n period.  
Most scholars suggest that the Korean position in East Asia strongly reﬂected the 
tribute system concept of Korea’s subjugation to a politically and militarily more pow-
erful superior, China.1)  And in the relationship with Tokugawa Japan (1603–1868), 
Choso˘n would have seen its neighboring state as a threat to peace after the Japanese 
invasions of 1592–1598 by Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536–1598).  Rather than seeing Ko-
rea’s subsequent acts as an exemplary display of the tributary relationship in pursuing 
an “appeasement policy” to the two neighboring countries, the Choso˘n court’s desper-
ate tactics that sought peaceful resolutions with the two states, China and Japan, are 
not difﬁcult to comprehend.  
The Choso˘n court sought to avoid conﬂicts with Qing China (1644–1911), which 
followed Ming China (1368–1644), and Tokugawa Japan in the seventeenth century. 
The Choso˘n court did not possess sufﬁcient military strength after the destruction of 
the battles fought against the Japanese invasions between 1592 and 1598 and the Man-
chus in 1627 and 1637.  In such a situation, making a deferential gesture would have 
seemed a strategy of survival for Choso˘n.  Subservience was indeed an initiative to 
bring about domestic safety, peace, and order.2)  The promises of the two “barbarian 
states”—Qing China for tribute system relations and Tokugawa Japan for the rehabili-
tation of diplomatic relations—also caused no physical harm.  The “submissive” pos-
ture was always a better outcome for Korean security at that time.
In the relationships with the Ming and Qing governments, the Choso˘n court en-
gaged sadae, or serving the great, as its diplomatic practice.  This relationship with the 
Chinese governments required a few main premises.  These included sending periodic 
tribute missions, receiving investiture, and acceptance and use of the Chinese calendar 
in the diplomatic protocol displayed to those governments.  Failure or refusal of any 
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of these was regarded as a violation in maintaining an ofﬁcial relationship with the su-
zerain state.  Hence, throughout the Choso˘n period, the court sent tribute envoys to 
the Ming and Qing governments and received imperial sanction when there was a 
succession to the throne at the Choso˘n court.  
To further understand Choso˘n as sojunghwa, or the small central civilization,3) it is 
vital to search for the common recognition which existed in East Asia.  For centuries 
the East Asian sphere was physically and mentally constructed within the Chinese-
centered view.  The area where the Chinese emperor ruled was often described as 
zhonghua,4) literally the “central civilization.”  In this perspective, the emperor was the 
one who ruled the world, reigned over the people with benevolence, and enlightened 
them with the virtues of heaven.  Outside of his enlightened states was yi, the uncivi-
lized area, in contrast to hua, the civilized area.  By constructing this hua–yi (civilized 
center–barbarian) view, the countries of yi could obtain the virtues of the center if they 
became tributaries to the great empire.5)  In respect for the Chinese emperor, the trib-
utary countries were able to receive beneﬁts and rewards when their tribute missions 
visited the Chinese capital to show their gratitude and respect.
In this historical context of zhonghua, accounts would have led to the Chinese dy-
nasties’ sole supremacy over East Asia, and the other surrounding states were accom-
modated with the dominant reign.  Nonetheless, Choso˘n could also be an “empire” or 
a “center” of the world.  I do not intend to deny the origin of the hua–yi worldview in 
China; Choso˘n certainly accepted the Chinese model as center.  But I would like to 
emphasize that self-centered views existed in the “barbarian” “eastern” state; Choso˘n 
had its own sense of zhonghua, or chunghwa in Korean.  This “world-centeredness” per-
spective implies that exclusive values of Choso˘n society were focused solely on itself 
as a single political entity.  Choso˘n kings and ofﬁcials composed criteria for looking at 
their state as the center and seeing the counterpart from the “center.”  Based upon 
those perceptions, different values and cultures were measured and evaluated with bi-
ased perspectives.
How Korean kings and ofﬁcials acknowledged their country beyond the Ming and 
Qing tribute systems is an important question.  Given Choso˘n’s geographical proximi-
ty to China, challenging the Chinese dynasties would result in immediate ruin.  In 
other words, Choso˘n found an effective way to survive with the sadae policy.  In rela-
tions with the Ming and Qing governments, the Choso˘n court accepted suzerain–sub-
ordinate relations.  Nonetheless, after the demise of Ming China, scholars, especially, 
raised about Choso˘n’s status vis-à-vis Qing China.  In particular, they asked, was Ming 
China Choso˘n’s suzerain?  Was not Ming China’s culture the culture to respect?  In 
addition to such a view toward Qing China, the Tokugawa bakufu was established in 
1603 while Choso˘n still possessed deep resentment over the Japanese invasions.  This 
self-esteem presented the Koreans with the Korean-centered world vision, which origi-
nated from the Chinese hua–yi order, by claiming itself as the sole remaining civilized 
country, represented as sojunghwa, or the small central civilization.  Korean scholars 
believed that Choso˘n was not a duplicate of China.6)  Although their country was not 
large, they proudly acclaimed their country as the central civilization.  
Within the shifting relations between the Ming and Qing governments, as well as 
the new relations with Tokugawa Japan, Choso˘n’s cultural self-esteem to protect itself 
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took the form of sojunghwa.  Choso˘n’s chunghwa awareness did not always accompany 
the political reality of the tribute and vassalage in the history of East Asia.  In Choso˘n’s 
case, political realism, such as tributary engagement with the Ming and Qing govern-
ments, did not interfere with the development of chunghwa thought, since the Chinese 
governments did not participate in internal political affairs of subordinate states.7)
The Koreans’ visions were ﬁrmly constrained within the traditional values of 
Choso˘n society.  How did the members of the Korean embassies form such a biased 
view towards the Japanese?  Their perspective seems to have been constructed in the 
changes in East Asia in the seventeenth century, and remained constant into the eigh-
teenth century and later.  The different feelings of the Korean to their Japanese coun-
terpart, for instance, were exclusively based on what they were familiar with in their 
culture.  In this regard, Koreans possessed their own standpoints regarding the rigid 
Confucian discipline by which to behave and to see the Japanese counterpart, and 
without doubt, Japanese ofﬁcials evaluated Korea from within their own cultural con-
texts.8)
The Relationship between Choso˘n and Tsushima 
The views of Koreans towards Japan and Japanese culture frequently exhibited 
prejudice, in contrast to their views towards China, which were expressed as mohwa, 
or emulation of China, that arose at the end of the Koryo˘ period (918–1392).9)  The 
Koreans’ perspective towards the Japanese was explicitly illustrated in the use of the 
term “uncivilized people.”  In the various records of the Choso˘n court and travelogues 
written by members of the Korean embassies to Japan, diarists used the term “waeguk” 
or “waein,” to indicate Japan or Japanese.  “Waeguk” meant “outlandish country” and 
“waein” stood for “strange, peculiar people.”10)  Another possible reason for Koreans 
to call Japan “waeguk” was Japan’s sporadic recognition of the tributary relationship 
with the Chinese governments in an unusual manner, as the Muromachi bakufu had 
been a member of the tribute system, but the Tokugawa bakufu was not.  For the Ko-
reans, Japan’s ﬂexible position was unimaginable, and Japan seemed outside the “uni-
versal” East Asian order.  
The diplomatic and commercial exchanges between Tokugawa Japan and Choso˘n 
were conducted through Tsushima as the intermediary.  The Tokugawa bakufu could 
not manage Korean issues without the island domain.  There seem to have been 
smooth interactions between Choso˘n and Tsushima, but there were several facts, 
promises, and protocols needed for Tsushima to adjust to Korean culture and customs. 
In those circumstances, Tsushima played the key role to bridge the gap between the 
two countries.  What did the Tsushima domain do to maintain the neighborly rela-
tions, and what types of views did Choso˘n hold regarding Tsushima?  
The Choso˘n court regarded the Tsushima domain as its tributary island, and the at-
tendance of Tsushima ofﬁcials at the ceremonies in Tongnae that honored the King of 
Choso˘n was mandatory.  Those rites were conducted in Ch’oryang, in Tongnae Coun-
ty, where the Japan House (K. Waegwan, J. Wakan), the area for ofﬁcial trade with the 
Korean government and the residential quarters for the Japanese,11) was located, and 
those rites strictly followed Korean ritual procedure.  The Tsushima ofﬁcials had to 
show their respect to the wooden ﬁgure that symbolized the king.  On these occasions, 
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the Tsushima ofﬁcials were sitting in the garden kneeling and bending down toward 
the front, but the Korean ofﬁcials and interpreters were standing close to the wooden 
ﬁgure.  The Tsushima ofﬁcials seemed to be paying obeisance to a group of Korean 
ofﬁcials.  Tsushima ofﬁcials appealed to the Koreans that “our ritual submission is 
aimed only for the Korean king, not the Korean ofﬁcials.  So do not stand by the 
ﬁgure.”  But the Choso˘n court never accepted this request.12)  Tsushima clearly was re-
garded as subordinate to Choso˘n.  
The relationship between the Korean and Tsushima ofﬁcials was that of a “superi-
or–inferior” relationship.  The members of the Korean embassies also demonstrated 
the belief that Tsushima belonged to Kyo˘ngsang Province.13)  When the daimyo of Tsu-
shima invited members of the 1719 embassy to a banquet, Sin Yuhan (1681–1752), the 
embassy’s Scribe, stated that they were not bound to follow Japanese procedures for 
the engagement.14)  Tsushima’s dual position between Choso˘n and Tokugawa Japan 
provided for awkward situations, for Tsushima was one of more than 200 domains ( J. 
han) under the shogun.  Although a domain of Tokugawa Japan, the Korean govern-
ment required that Tsushima ofﬁcials, that is, Japanese ofﬁcials, to attend the ceremo-
nies conducted by the Choso˘n government.  With some reluctance, Tsushima attended 
these ritual ceremonies in accordance with the praxis in Korean convention.  
To further develop diplomatic and commercial practices, Tsushima was forced to 
adjust to the Korean customs and traditions, as the islanders depended upon the Kore-
an trade for their livelihood.  The island needed to defend its exclusive privilege in 
managing interactions with Choso˘n, which had been assigned by Tokugawa Ieyasu. 
By the bakufu founder’s strong wish, no other domain could interfere or challenge the 
privileges of the island.  However, the bakufu could exert very little control over Tsu-
shima in the elaborate negotiations between the island and Choso˘n.15)  In this sense, 
the bakufu could not censor Tsushima’s acceptance of the Korean ceremonial rites, as 
the island was the only domain that knew how to maintain the neighborly relationship 
and to handle Korean issues.  
Tsushima continued its “efforts” to maintain friendly interactions with Choso˘n, for 
termination of participation in the ceremony for the Korean king would result in 
breakdown of diplomatic and commercial relations.16)  For the bakufu, Tsushima’s at-
tendance at this Korean state rite did not directly weaken the inﬂuence of the Tokuga-
wa polity.17)  Each domain was administered autonomously by the local daimyo and 
his ofﬁcials, and Tsushima, too, had to control internal issues for its own sake.  The 
central government ofﬁcials in Edo did not intervene in what the Tsushima ofﬁcials 
did as long as the practical issues with the neighboring state were smoothly man-
aged.18)  In this situation, the presence of Tsushima ofﬁcials at the rites in Tongnae may 
have provided the Koreans with a sense of superiority over the Japanese.  How was 
the awareness of Choso˘n’s superiority constructed?  To answer this question and to 
comprehend the tangled threads of the interactions, an understanding of the historical 
background of the Korean side is vital.  
Sadae kyorin Based on Confucian Principle
Choso˘n’s adoption of Confucianism began in the fourteenth century.  The founder 
of Choso˘n, Yi So˘nggye (r. 1392–1398) who overthrew Koryo˘, sought sanction from 
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Ming China as the new and legitimate ruler.  He also asked the Ming court to decide 
between “Choso˘n” or “Hwanyo˘ng.”  as the name for the new country.  The Ming 
court preferred “Choso˘n,” based on the story of Kija Choso˘n.19)  The third king, 
T’aejong, achieved recognition by the third Ming emperor as the King of Choso˘n, and 
the tributary relationship with the Ming government began.
The endeavours of the Neo-Confucian inﬁltration into the newly-established 
Choso˘n society were vigorous.  The advisor of the ﬁrst king, Cho˘ng Tojo˘n (1342–
1398), attempted to establish Neo-Confucianism as the social doctrine.  After Chong 
was killed by his political opponent, Kwo˘n Ku˘n (1353–1409) inherited Cho˘ng’s aim 
and devoted himself to the further introduction of Neo-Confucian principles into 
society.  Through this process, Neo-Confucianism as the unyielding moral conduct 
was consolidated in Choso˘n society.  Buddhism, the state religion of the former 
government, was disdained as heterodoxy by the proponents of Neo-Confucianism 
among ofﬁcials and scholars.20)  The transmission of Neo-Confucian doctrine was 
strongly connected to the respect for Ming China, which had adopted Neo-
Confucianism.  In addition, the Ming military alliance during the late-sixteenth 
century invasions against the Japanese armies impressed Koreans as the action of a 
savior, represented as chaejo chiu˘n, or the benevolence of the saver of the state, which 
was also deeply rooted in society.  
From the unbending perspective of the Confucian manner in viewing the East 
Asian sphere, how did Choso˘n see the tributary relationship?  To answer the question, 
the deﬁnition of tributary relationship should be considered.  William Rockhill gives a 
brief explanation of the tribute system between Ming China and Choso˘n as follows:
As to the custom of Korean kings submitting to the Emperor of China for his 
approval the name of the heirs to their throne, of their consorts, of informing 
him of deaths in the Royal Family these again are strictly ceremonial relations 
bearing with them no idea of subordination, other than that of respect and 
deference on the part of a younger member of a family to its recognized head…. 
During Ming dynasty of China, the people of Korea chose their sovereign 
without consulting China, and the latter power only entered a mild protest.… 
There is no case recorded in which the Emperor of China disapproved of the 
choice the King of Korea has made of his successor or his consort.21)
Engaging tributary relations may give us a notion of the stringent hierarchical order 
and the Chinese coercive dominance over the Choso˘n court.  As seen in Rockhill’s 
account, Ming China provided Choso˘n with political autonomy.  Under this system, 
China was discouraged from intervening in both the internal and the external affairs 
of Choso˘n as long as the premises of the tributary relationship with the Chinese court 
were guaranteed.22)  After the establishment of the Qing government in 1644, most 
institutions and cultural manners were transferred from the Ming government to the 
Qing government.  Accordingly, the Qing government adopted the tribute system for 
relations with Choso˘n.23)
Sadae kyorin should also be analyzed with the tributary relationship.  The concept of 
sadae initially came from the Chinese text Chunqiu zuozhuan.  There it is stated, “The 
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great nourishes the lesser, and the lesser serves the great.”24)  Sadae as a diplomatic 
concept emerged in the Warring States period (770 B.C.E.–443 B.C.E.) when 
Confucius encountered domestic turmoil in his country.  In the chaotic conditions, his 
emphasis lay in the view that morality should be the basis of the representation of 
solid order between human beings and society, and this would disallow the forcible 
dominance of the smaller states by the greater states.  To establish peaceful political 
institutions, retaining propriety was highlighted.  And to avoid further meaningless 
wars, the relationship between the greater and the smaller countries had to be 
articulated by propriety, much like that between the sovereign and subject.  This 
perspective became the core of the tributary relationship.  
In accepting Neo-Confucian doctrine, the Choso˘n government ﬁrmly established 
sadae kyorin as its diplomatic principle.  For Korean kings and ofﬁcials in the 
seventeenth century, sadae indicated their country’s relations with the Ming and Qing 
governments.  The Korean court constituted the diplomatic relationship with the 
Tokugawa bakufu based upon kyorin.25)  Unlike sadae, the principle of kyorin meant 
friendship based on equal standing.  By the coexistence of the policies of sadae and 
kyorin, Choso˘n was able to ease militaristic tension with the greater and smaller states 
that surrounded it.26)
Choso˘n’s Dilemma: Between Two Neighboring States
Choso˘n experienced signiﬁcant transformations in the seventeenth century.  The 
Choso˘n court no longer ignored the presence of the “two lesser civilized,” yet newly-
risen neighboring states of Qing China and Tokugawa Japan.  Those states were 
regarded as uncivilized and barbarian by Choso˘n, but their inﬂuence on the East 
Asian environment was not minor or trivial.  The Choso˘n court had to adapt to the 
emergences of these two states.  Though the people in the two states were vulgar to 
Koreans, those uncivilized people already seemed to seize more military power and to 
begin threatening the security of the Korean peninsula.  
How did Choso˘n react to these conditions?  In Choso˘n’s diplomatic strategy, the 
Choso˘n court maintained sadae with Qing China and kyorin with Tokugawa Japan. 
The Manchu’s Qing government became Choso˘n’s new suzerain state, and the 
Choso˘n court showed the Qing emperor its acceptance of the tribute system after 
defeat in the two wars known in Korea as the Cho˘ngyu horan, in 1627, and the Pyo˘ngja 
horan, in 1636.27)  After the second invasion, in 1637, the Manchus demanded that 
Choso˘n become a vassal state.  This use of force enormously increased negative 
sentiments among the Koreans.  Choso˘n’s only suzerain state was Ming China, and 
the Choso˘n court’s refusal to submit to the Manchus showed its loyalty to the still 
viable but greatly weakened Ming government.  The Manchus’ military power 
threatened the Korean peninsula.  Consequently, King Injo (r. 1623–1649) was forced 
to renounce allegiance to the Ming court in 1637.  
The two wars with the Manchus brought great damage to the Korean peninsula. 
Choso˘n could not ignore the rise of the “northern barbarians,” and those people were 
an object of contempt after Choso˘n’s defeat.  However, Choso˘n’s feelings of cultural 
superiority over the Manchus emerged at the same time, as they were the northern 
barbarians who were not civilized.  In other words, the Koreans had to follow the 
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civilized Ming culture.  Such Korean attachments to Ming China were unyielding, and 
this strong sentiment continued even after the demise of the Ming court.  Among the 
Korean scholars who continued to greatly admire Ming China, the pukpo˘llon, or 
retribution against the northern barbarians, had prevailed in support of the Ming 
court.  Nevertheless, paying tribute to an “antagonist” was more rational for Choso˘n, 
as the three wars, one against the Japanese and two against the Manchus, had inﬂicted 
great damage upon Korea.28)
Qing China’s prosperity provided Choso˘n with complex problems.  Tributary 
relations with the Qing government was often linked with Choso˘n’s economic growth, 
nevertheless, the Choso˘n court suffered ﬁnancial difﬁculties in maintaining the 
tributary relationship.29)  In contrast to decreasing commodities from Qing China to 
Choso˘n, the Choso˘n court had to ready supplies and tribute gifts for each tribute 
mission to Beijing.30)
In addition, the Manchus overthrew Ming China, but the Choso˘n court conﬁrmed 
its promise of tribute to the Qing government.  Despite this engagement, for Choso˘n, 
Ming China was the only state to admire in the cultural context.  The Choso˘n court 
was obligated to use the Qing calendar.  However, resistance among Korean scholars 
who disliked the submission to the northern barbarians came into view.  Some of their 
private documents were dated with the last reign title of Ming China, and this dating 
pattern held favor among scholars until the end of the nineteenth century.31)  And 
several ritual sites to worship Ming emperors were established in Hanso˘ng 
(contemporary Seoul) under the protection of the Choso˘n court.32)
From the political context, Choso˘n’s diplomatic principle of sadae kyorin ﬁtted into 
the Choso˘n court’s realistic strategy.  Justiﬁcation for the tributary engagement with 
Qing China was based on the Confucian discipline for the smaller state to submit to 
the greater.  As long as the premise was kept, Choso˘n could preserve itself and the 
people at peace, and avoid war.33)  Sadae kyorin appears a passive action, but for the 
Choso˘n court the diplomatic principle followed the Confucian doctrine that brought 
Choso˘n domestic peace and order.  
What did the kyorin relations with Tokugawa Japan mean for Choso˘n?  Retaining 
the friendly relationship with Tokugawa Japan was a signiﬁcant part of Korean 
diplomacy to keep Korean territory secure.  The Choso˘n court always seemed to 
select the best possible way for its own survival; reengagement of neighborly relations, 
now with the Tokugawa bakufu, was one facet of the court’s strategy to maintain peace 
with the outside world.  Yet the Japanese invasions of Choso˘n were still a vivid 
memory at the time of the Manchus’ invasions and later.  Hideyoshi’s aggressions 
provided a sufﬁcient rationale for the Koreans to become alarmed about the possibility 
of reinvasion from Japan.  Indeed, Choso˘n’s pursuit of “friendly relations while 
remaining cautious” continued until the last embassy in 1811, though the worries about 
Japanese political conditions gradually lessened.34)  The Japanese invasions left a 
stronger resentment in Choso˘n society than bakufu ofﬁcials imagined.  The Tokugawa 
bakufu, however, showed Choso˘n friendly gestures and seemed harmless.  To sustain 
the kyorin policy, Choso˘n restored neighborly relations with Japan, and the 
relationship guaranteed the peace between the two countries.  The diplomatic policy 
of the Choso˘n court in the seventeenth century was always aimed at how to survive 
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between the new powers.  
In any circumstances, the newly rising states across the northern border and across 
the eastern sea were a great risk to Korean security.  The Choso˘n court was required 
to convert its attitude regarding the relations with the Qing court and Tokugawa Japan, 
from antagonism to the Manchus and the Japanese to a positive attitude.  Through the 
diplomatic engagements with those new governments, Choso˘n was able to peacefully 
maintain relations with the “two barbarians,” and to keep the state and the people at 
peace, which was the most vital endeavor in protecting Choso˘n.35)
Choso˘n as Sojunghwa
Choso˘n, having encountered the demise and rise of its neighboring states in the 
seventeenth century, had to consolidate and conﬁrm its own standing in East Asia. 
These conditions surrounding the Korean peninsula led the Choso˘n society to conﬁrm 
its distinctiveness and its distance from the “unusual,” “uncivilized,” and “barbarian” 
cultures of Qing China or Tokugawa Japan.  
“Serving the great” became “serving the Ming government,” and strengthened into 
an inﬂexible value in Choso˘n society for more than a century.  Under the Korean 
hua–yi construct, the relationship between Ming China and Choso˘n never became one 
of equals, but was comparable to the relationship between sovereign and subject, 
father and son, or elder brother and younger brother.36)  The sadae relations towards 
Ming China were regarded as an absolute criterion for Choso˘n.  However, after the 
demise of the Ming government, engaging in tributary relations with both the Ming 
government and the Qing government gave Choso˘n great anxiety, as “serving the two 
dynasties” meant violation of Confucian principle.  This apprehension contributed to 
a consciousness of “what is Korea,” especially among scholars.  Although Qing China 
was the suzerain state, cultural veneration of Ming China among scholars was 
unchanging.  How could Choso˘n bridge the transition from Ming to Qing 
governments?  In this situation, Choso˘n elites found a way to resolve the issue: 
Choso˘n was the only state to succeed to Ming civilization.  This self-respect of Choso˘n 
led to claiming their country as the sojunghwa, or the small central civilization.37)
In the climate of Choso˘n’s presenting tribute to Qing China, the search by Korean 
scholars for “who we were” resulted in an enhanced sense of their country as a center. 
This sense of Korea’s cultural expression was represented as sojunghwa, which 
provided those scholars with a strong sense of their cultural superiority over Qing 
China and Tokugawa Japan.  Chunghwa had long signiﬁed China, a place of ﬂourishing 
civilization and culture, as well as a center of the world.  Such a view of sojunghwa
treated Choso˘n as the last bastion for protecting and preserving the Ming culture. 
Choso˘n’s consciousness as sojunghwa developed in Choso˘n society and came from a 
search for self-awareness amid the external turmoil in the ﬁrst half of the seventeenth 
century.  Consequently, Korean scholars possessed a feeling that the highly-civilized 
culture only ﬂourished in Choso˘n, for the Manchus, as barbarians, did not succeed to 
the Ming culture.  
Between the barbarian states of Qing China and Tokugawa Japan, Choso˘n was the 
only country that preserved the appropriate and highly civilized culture.  How could 
one determine whether the state was highly civilized or not?  The answer was simple: 
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how deeply had Confucianism developed and spread throughout society?38)  Choso˘n 
also claimed itself to be the “last place to protect Confucianism” after the rise of Qing 
China.  In this perspective, some scholars speculated on Choso˘n as being a model of 
the “perfected Chinese pattern,”39) and the circumstance surrounding Choso˘n has 
been focused on the tribute system with the Chinese governments.  However, Choso˘n 
was not without interactions with other states in East Asia, though the tributary 
relationship signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced Choso˘n society.  Andre Schmid criticizes the 
scholarship on Korea for often tending to look at a sino-centered relationship in regard 
to Korea’s diplomatic policy until the modern period.40)  In seeing a different direction, 
Choso˘n’s own “proclamation” was expressed as, as Schmid writes, “Now the center 
was in the east.”41)  This view would also provide more extensive discussions on 
Korea’s cultural awareness as the center of civilization.
Before the establishment of Choso˘n, there already existed a concept of Korea’s 
existence as a distinguished and unique state.  When ofﬁcials from Southern Song 
China (1127–1279) were impressed by Koryo˘’s political system, which had a more 
advanced administrative organization than their own state, they named a lodge for the 
Koryo˘ envoys in the capital city, Pinin (current Hangzhou),42) as the “house of a small 
civilization.”43)  In a similar period, two envoys from Song China were struck by the 
literary works of two Koryo˘ bureaucrats, and after their return to China, they 
published an anthology of the Koreans’ works as Sohwa chip, or “Collected Writings of 
the Small Civilization.”44)  The background of sojunghwa, the breadth and depth of 
Chinese civilization in Koryo˘ society, was widely acknowledged.  From the Koryo˘ 
period, a perception of sojunghwa seems already to have emerged.  However, Koryo˘ 
did not distinguish itself as a unique entity, as the state was “civilized” next to the 
Chinese culture.45)
To further analyze Choso˘n’s perspective on the “center,” Choso˘n scholars seemed 
to have a contradictory sentiment towards Ming China, as well.  By possessing a 
cultural reverence to Ming China, accepting it as the middle kingdom, some scholars 
found a more appropriate and ideal model of a middle kingdom in Choso˘n, as they 
saw that Ming China had failed to become the ideal model.  Korean scholars and 
ofﬁcials who visited Ming China recognized that the superlative model of a middle 
kingdom did not exist in Ming society due to the spread of immoral manners.  For 
example, bribery grew to be an evil practice.  If the yo˘nhaengsa46) envoys did not give 
enticements to the Chinese ofﬁcials in order to pass through the gate to Beijing, they 
were denied entrance.47)  The old and ruined institutions for Confucian study were not 
comparable to those in Choso˘n.  Cho Ho˘n showed his disappointment at the lack of 
scholastic depth in Ming China in 1574.  At the Guoziguan, the most prominent 
Confucian institution in Beijing, he saw that the wall of the building had collapsed and 
not been repaired, and the valuable collections of books in the library had been buried 
in dust.48)  Teachers did not lecture in the classroom, as most of the students had 
abandoned their studies and left the school to return to their home villages.  The 
people in Ming China, who were living in the central civilization, did not actually 
respect or advocate Confucianism.  By looking at the facts, Korean scholars realized 
that they had a much more enthusiastic attitude in learning the Confucian discipline 
that was embedded as the principle of social conduct in their country.  In other words, 
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Choso˘n excelled over the “originator.”  Although Choso˘n was an eastern barbarian 
state, there was something in that country which could be acclaimed.
On a different aspect of Ming loyalism, Han Myo˘nggi questions chaejo chiu˘n, which 
was seen as an important concept during and after the Japanese invasions.  He argues 
that Choso˘n was seen as a different state, and Choso˘n was born as the will of heaven, 
not as a duplication of China.49)  Although the relations between Choso˘n and Ming 
China were relatively friendly until the late sixteenth century, Chinese interference in 
domestic politics at the Choso˘n court appeared during the invasions.  The local people 
suffered from having to furnish enormous military provisions to Ming soldiers, and 
the illegal dealings in food ﬂourished.50)  Those supplies to Ming China caused Korean 
soldiers to lose their ﬁghting strength from lack of food.51)  In the historical context, 
relations with Ming China were often seen through the chaejo chiu˘n concept.  In fact, 
Koreans also suffered from the frequent vandalism of Ming soldiers, and their acts 
brought consequential damage to the local residents.52)
After the establishment of Qing China, Korean scholars questioned the deﬁnition of 
a middle kingdom.  Hwang Kyo˘ngwo˘n (1709–1787) examined the characterization of 
the center as: “What is the middle kingdom?  It is only shown by propriety.  If 
propriety exists, barbarians can be the central civilization, and China could be a 
barbarian state [if propriety does not exist].  In [the case of] individuals, as well, 
whether or not one possesses propriety determines [whether one is] a savage or not.”53)
Another Korean scholar, Hong Taeyong (1731–1783), who was an envoy in the 
yo˘nhaengnsa embassy to Qing China in 1765, came to a view similar to that of Hwang. 
Hong believed that the distinction of hua and yi depended on the “possession of 
civilization.”  He continued, “If Confucius were born in Korea, an ideal middle 
kingdom would have been established outside of his country [China], namely in the 
Korean peninsula.”54)  He wrote further, “Korea indeed is an eastern barbarian.  It is 
certainly so in seeing [us] from the geographical location.  But why should we conceal 
the truth [that Korea is a barbarian]?”55)
Regarding the relations with Tokugawa Japan, members of the Korean embassies to 
Japan frequently saw the Japanese with a somewhat biased view, as they measured the 
Japanese and their culture based solely on their own long-standing Confucian 
traditions and self-esteem as people of a “highly civilized” state.56)  While conversing 
with Japanese scholars, So˘ng Taejung, the second diarist of the 1763 embassy, 
described his country as follows: “Our state [Korea] is indeed a home of 
civilization.”57)
The Korean ofﬁcials’ sense of cultural superiority over the Japanese was often 
revealed in their travelogues.  Choso˘n’s own expression of distinctiveness as a “small 
central civilization” functioned as the solid standard by which the members of the 
Korean embassy could measure difference and foreignness, and the consciousness 
may have somewhat shifted to the superior-inferior view towards the Japanese 
counterpart.  On this point, Nam-lin Hur writes, “… civilization should be gauged by 
the yardstick of poetry, (Chinese poems), calligraphy, social etiquette, paintings, and 
music-the means through which the feeble human mind could be cultivated toward 
the Neo-Confucian ideals.  In terms of achieving authentic (i.e., Confucian) civilization, 
Tokugawa Japan was placed far behind the society of Choso˘n Korea.”58)  Korean 
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ofﬁcials in the embassies saw the Japanese culture as far inferior to the Korean culture. 
In these circumstances, kyorin relations with Japan were not greatly emphasized at the 
Choso˘n court.59)  Chang Yo˘nso˘ng reveals the nature of the kyorin policy as one that 
“included certain prejudice, self-supremacy, and an attempt to place the [ Japanese] 
counterpart in a lower position.”60)
Sadae kyorin was the diplomatic framework for Choso˘n towards the two Chinese 
governments and the new Japanese state.  Although this framework was an effective 
tool for a small country’s survival, the attitude of superiority also cast a negative 
aspect.  The critical decisions of the Choso˘n government were reliant on the greater. 
During the Japanese invasion, the Chinese emperor’s envoy went to Choso˘n and then 
to Japan to negotiate an armistice with Japan.  Choso˘n did not seem to inﬂuence the 
negotiations between Ming China and Hideyoshi, and was treated as a mere onlooker. 
Through the rise of the barbarian states of Qing China and Tokugawa Japan, 
Choso˘n scholars seemed to consolidate a solid sense of self-esteem based upon 
Choso˘n as the only country where the highly civilized culture ﬂourished.  Although 
they had long encountered the quandary that as an eastern barbarian state their 
country could never become a middle kingdom, they began to describe their country 
as sojunghwa, as a small center of civilized culture.  In embracing the ironic belief of 
being barbarian but culturally civilized, Korean scholars pursued an “ideal” posture of 
middle kingdom, and depicted their country as the perfect model to become the true 
central civilization.61)
This perception of the esteem of sojunghwa, however, was limited to a small segment 
of the population, to scholars and some government ofﬁcials.  The commoners who 
were in the majority likely did not know of such a perception.  Sojunghwa did not 
develop as a driving force to help change the rigid Choso˘n society towards the modern 
period, as the belief that Choso˘n was the sojunghwa functioned to maintain Choso˘n as 
a “highly civilized state,” and to protect the Korean peninsula from the turmoil of the 
outside world in the seventeenth century.  This kind of closed view in Choso˘n society, 
of not accepting new ideas, seemed to increase over time.  
Conclusion
Choso˘n Korea faced a series of difﬁculties from the end of the sixteenth century 
into the seventeenth century: the invasions by the Japanese and the two wars with the 
Manchus.  When each war occurred, the Korean peninsula turned into a battleﬁeld 
and suffered much then and later from the severe ﬁghting.  After facing the rise of the 
new regimes in China and Japan, Choso˘n elites fostered a sense of sojunghwa, a view 
of Korea as a civilized center, distinguishing itself from the two “barbarian” states. 
Choso˘n’s pursuit of the diplomatic principle of sadae kyorin, which was based on 
Confucian discipline, was conﬁrmed, and the policy provided Choso˘n with domestic 
peace and order.  Also, sadae kyorin was Choso˘n’s best possible effort to protect the 
country from the two barbarian countries north and south of the Korean peninsula.
Under neighborly relations, Tokugawa Japan and Choso˘n were able to enjoy 
diplomatic and commercial exchange for more than two centuries.  The Korean 
embassy was seen as the symbol of the mutual friendship between the Japanese and 
the Koreans, and the bakufu welcomed the Korean delegations.  Through the diaries 
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and other records of the embassies, the Choso˘n court was able to directly observe 
Japan’s political and economic conditions and to closely examine Japanese society. 
The visits of embassies in the ﬁrst half of the seventeenth century also enabled the 
Tokugawa bakufu to enhance its domestic legitimacy and demonstrate its authority.  In 
this sense, the Korean embassies were necessary for the two countries.  
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